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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of 
speeding, a violation of Logan City Ordinance 42/7/1, in the First 
Circuit Court, Cache County, Utah. The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction over this appeal under Section 78-2a-3(2) (d), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
1) Whether or not Logan City and/or the State of Utah may 
establish a twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school when children 
are going to or leaving school during opening or closing hours. 
2) Whether or not a citation with a written premise to appear may 
be issued by a police officer for a misdemeanor offense cotmitted in his 
presence in lieu of placing the person under arrest and taking him into 
custody. 
3) Whether or not Utah Cbde Annotated (1953) §77-7-18 through 
77-7-21 enabling this act is unconstitutionally vague. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND ORDINANCES 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended): 
41-6-46 
41-6-47 
41-6-48 
1 
77-7-18 
77-7-19 
77-7-20 
Logan City Ordinance 
42-7-1 
Complete Copies of the foregoing statutes and ordinances are 
included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal frcm a jury verdict finding Appellant guilty of 
speeding, in the First Circuit Court of Cache County, Utah. The 
Appellant is requesting the Court of Appeals to reverse his conviction 
based on the following: (1) Appellant was issued a citation for 
speeding and gave his written premise to appear in lieu of being 
arrested and taken into custody by the arresting officer; (2) Logan City 
and/or State of Utah may not establish a twenty mile per hour speed 
limit near a school when children are going to or leaving school during 
opening or closing hours; (3) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
§77-7-18 through 77-7-21 referred to as the citation enabling act by 
Appellant is unconstitutionally vague. 
Respondent contends that Appellant's arguments are without merit 
and Appellant's conviction should be affirmed. The prosecution herein 
was under a formal written information thereby rendering Appellant's 
arguments regarding citations and Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
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§77-7-18 through 77-7-21 constitutionality irrelevant to the case 
herein. Furthermore, Logan City and/or the State of Utah clearly had 
authority to establish a twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school 
when children are going to or leaving school during opening or closing 
hours, 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 16, 1988 at 8:40 a.m., the Logan City Crossing Guard 
turned on two yellow flashing lights (T. 74 Ln. 12) to designate a 
"school zone, speed limit 20 miles per hour" (T. 48 Ln. 3-4) at Fourth 
North of Logan City where daily approximately thirty to forty children 
cross to go to and fron school (T. 75 Ln. 8-11). 
An officer had been assigned to run traffic control in the area 
that morning, in the area of the school zone because quite often people 
fail to slew down and observe the speed limit (T. 42 Ln. 20-23). 
At 9:00 a.m., the officer tested his radar equipment to assure that 
it was working properly (T. 49 Ln. 10-25 and T. 50 Ln. 1-7). The 
equipment was later rechecked at 9:25 a.m. (T. 52 Ln. 2-3) to again 
verify that it was working properly (T. 52 Ln. 15-18). 
At 9:13 a.m., the officer observed a vehicle driven by Appellant 
(T. 47 Ln. 15) , which based upon his over twenty-two years of police 
work as well as training in regard to radar operation and certification, 
was visually estimated at traveling 34 miles per hour (T. 51, Ln. 2-18, 
T. 53 Ln. 5) . The officer then obtained a radar reading of 33 miles per 
hour (T. 53 Ln. 7-8). The Appellant was then pulled over for speeding. 
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Appellant in lieu of being formally arrested and taken into custody was 
issued a citation on which he signed his written premise to appear. 
Exhibit "A" in the Addendum herein. The City later filed a formal 
information upon Appellant for speeding in violation of Revised 
Ordinances of Logan City 42-7-1 which was proceeded on at the trial (T. 
39 Ln. 5-21). Exhibit "B" in the Addendum herein. 
The officer testified that 33 miles per hour was not a reasonable 
and prudent speed in this particular area at the particular time because 
there were several-quite a few children who use that 
street, live south of Fourth North and go to school 
at the Adams School which is on 5th North and Fourth 
East. They have to cross Fourth North, which is the 
main thoroughfare. In fact, it is a State Highway 
running East and West in Logan City. It is a four 
lane high-road. Traffic volume is very heavy, 
particularly at that time of day. The kids are 
going, not only to grade school, but to the Uni-
versity, to and from, and work and whatever have 
you, and these children are required to cross that 
street, and it is very hazardous to allow the 
traffic to travel at that speed without endangering 
these children. (T. 55 Ln 17-25, T. 56 Ln. 1-3). 
The flashing lights were turned off by the crossing guard at 9:25 
a.m. (T. 74 Ln. 12). The school's first bell is at 9:10 a.m. and the 
las bell is at 9:15 a.m. (T. 80 Ln. 4-6). 
The Appellant admitted that he was travelling 33 miles per hour in 
a school zone (T. 99 Ln. 1-8). 
The jury found the Appellant guilty of speeding as set forth in the 
formal information filed by Logan City (T. 40 Ln. 9-11). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. LOGAN CITY AND/OR STATE OF UTAH MAY ESTABLISH A TWENTY MILE PER 
HOUR SPEED LIMIT NEAR A SCHOOL WHEN CHILDREN ARE GOING TO OR LEAVING 
SCHOOL DURING OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS. 
2. A CITATION WITH A WRITTEN PROMISE TO APPEAR MAY BE ISSUED BY A 
POLICE OFFICER FOR A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE CCMMITTED IN HIS PRESENCE IN 
LIEU OF PLACING THE PERSON UNDER ARREST AND TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY. 
3. THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 as amended) §77-7-18 THROUGH 77-7-21 
IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
ARGUMENT 
1 
LOGAN CITY AND/OR STATE OF UTAH MAY ESTABLISH 
A TWENTY MILE PER HOUR SPEED LIMIT NEAR A SCHOOL 
WHEN CHILDREN ARE GOING TO OR LEAVING SCHOOL 
DURING OPENING AND CLOSING HOURS 
The Tenth Amendment to the United State Constitution provides that 
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-46 provides: 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
greater than is reasonable and prudent under the 
conditions and having regard to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing 
(2)...the following speeds are lawful. Any speed in 
excess of these limits is prima facie evidence that 
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the speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it 
is unlawful: (a) twenty miles per hour when passing 
a school building or its grounds during school 
recess or while children are going to or leaving 
school during opening or closing hours, except that 
local authorities may require a complete stop before 
passing a school building or grounds at any of these 
periods;.••(emphasis added) 
In the present case evidence was presented that thirty to forty 
children cross daily within the designated school zone on Fourth North 
of Logan City going to and fron school (T. 75 Ln. 8-11). The first bell 
is at 9:15 a.m. (T. 80 Lnw 4-6). In fact, children have shown up as 
late as 9:22 a.m. (T. 79 Ln. 25). The Appellant was observed speeding 
in the school zone at 9:13 a.m. (T. 47 Ln. 15). 
Further, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-47 provides: 
(1) (a) When the Department of Transportation 
determines upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed 
under this article is not reasonable or safe the 
existing conditions at the intersection or other 
place or on a state highway, the Department of 
Transportation may determine a reasonable and safe 
prima facie speed limit 
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate 
signs giving notice are erected at the intersection 
or other place or part of the highway, (emphasis 
added) 
It appears fron the facts of the case herein that the yellow 
flashing lights on Fourth North of Logan denoting a "school zone, speed 
limit 20 miles per hour", were established by the State of Utah. Fourth 
North is a state highway (T. 83 Ln. 4-8) . 
Therefore, even if this is not a school zone as Appellant argues, 
the speed limit of 20 miles per hour would be effective under Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) §41-6-47(2) and under Logan City Ordinance 
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42-7-1 (b) (2) providing "speed limits on state highways within the city 
limits shall be posted by the State". 
Additionally and importantly, evidence was produced that 33 miles 
per hour was not reasonable nor prudent under the conditions and having 
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing as prescribed 
by Logan City Ordinance 42-7-1 and Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
§41-6-46. 
As the arresting officer testified about traveling 33 miles per 
hour during the time of day the Appellant was in the Fourth North school 
zone: 
There were several-quite a few children that use the 
street, live across the street, live south of Fourth 
North and they go to school which is on 500 North 
and Fourth East. They have to cross Fourth North, 
which is the main thoroughfare, in fact, it's a 
state highway running east and west in Logan City. 
It is a four lane high-road, traffic volume is very 
heavy, particularly at that time of day the kids are 
going, not only to grade school, but to the 
university, to and fran to work and whatever have 
you, and these children are required to cross that 
street, and it is very hazardous to allow traffic to 
travel at that speed without endangering those 
children." (T. 55 Ln. 11-25, T. 56 Ln 1-3). 
Clearly there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could 
find the Appellant guilty of speeding in violation of Logan City 
Ordinance 42-7-1. 
Finally, it is unclear from the record whether or not this issue 
was raised by Appellant in the lower court or is being raised for the 
first time on appeal. 
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2 
A CITATION WITH A WRITTEN PROMISE TO APPEAR 
MAY BE ISSUED BY A POLICE OFFICER FOR A 
MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE COMMITTED IN HIS 
PRESENCE IN LIEU OF PLACING THE PERSON 
UNDER ARREST AND TAKING HIM INTO CUSTODY 
First, this case was prosecuted under a formal written information 
(T. 39 In. 5-21, see Addendum Exhibit "B" also) as required by Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 and 77-35-5. Therefore, it appears 
that the arguments made by Appellant in regard to the citation herein 
are irrelevant. 
Second, Appellant places a great deal of emphasis on the Court of 
Appeals decision in Logan City v. Karen Thatcher, No. 880451. That case 
was not decided on the merits but rather 
Based upon the failure of Respondent Logan City, a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah and the 
prosecutor herein, to appear at oral argument or to 
file a brief herein, the Defendant's conviction is 
hereby reversed and the charge of driving on 
improper registration is dismissed. 
A copy of the remitter in that case is en the Addendum to this 
brief. 
Third, in regard to the citation itself, Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as airended) §77-7-18 authorizes a peace officer in lieu of taking a 
person into custody to issue and deliver a citation requiring the person 
subject to arrest on a misdemeanor to appear before the Court. 
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-20 sets forth what a 
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citation must contain. It must contain 
(a) The name of the court before which the person 
is to appear; 
(b) The name of the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charged; 
(d) The date, time and place at which the offense 
is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date the citation was issued; 
(f) Name of the peace officer who issued the 
citation..,; 
(g) The time and date or before and after which the 
person is to appear; 
(h) The address of the court in which the person is 
to appear; 
(i) A certification above the signature of the 
officer issuing the citation in substantially the 
following language: "I certify that a copy of this 
citation or information (Summons and Complaint) was 
duly served upon the Defendant according to law on 
the above date and I knew or believe and so allege 
that the above-named Defendant did carmit the 
offense herein set forth contrary to law. I further 
certify ahat the court which the Defendant has been 
directed to appear is the proper court pursuant to 
Section 77-7-21"; and 
(j) A notice containing substantially the following 
language: "READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not 
be used as an information without your consent. If 
an information is filed you will be provided a copy 
by the court. You MUST appear in court on or before 
the time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO 
APPEAR AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE COURT 
MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR ARREST." 
The citation herein contained in the Addendum as Exhibit A clearly 
complies with Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-20. In fact, 
the citation on the back indicates that, "This citation is not an 
information and will not be used as an information without your 
consent". Furthermore, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) 
§77-7-20 (i) refers to "a copy of this citation or information (Summons 
or Complaint). 
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3 
THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED) 
§77-7-18 THROUGH 77-7-21 IS NOT 
UNCONSTITUTIONAliY VAGUE 
As previously noted, this case was prosecuted under a formal 
written information (T. 39 Ln. 5-21 & see Addendum Exhibit "B" also) as 
required by Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 and 77-35-5. 
Therefore, it appears that the arguments made by Appellant in regard to 
the citation herein are irrelevant. 
Also as previously noted, Appellant places a great deal of emphasis 
on the Court of Appeals decision in Logan City v. Karen Thatcher, No. 
880451. That case was not decided on the merits but rather based upon 
the Respondent Logan City's failure to file a brief or appear at oral 
arguments. 
In construing the constitutionality of a statute or ordinance, a 
court should construe law so as to carry out the legislative intent 
while avoiding constitutional conflicts. In Re A Criminal Investigation 
Seventh District Court Number CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) An 
ordinance or statute will not be declared unconstitutional on account of 
vagueness if under any sensible interpretation of its language it can be 
given practical effect. Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
In ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute or 
ordinance, the following rules of construction should be applied: 
1) A Legislative enactment is presumed to be 
valid and in conformity with the constitution. Trade 
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Camiission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d 431, 446 
P.2d 958 (1968); Greaves v. State, supra. 
2) The statute or ordinance should not be 
invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be 
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision 
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969). 
3) The burden of showing invalidity of an ordinance or 
statute is upon the one who makes the challenge Trade Commission v. 
Skaggs Drug Centers, supra. 
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561, 
563 (1952), it was recognized 
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional if 
there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be 
sustained as falling within the constitutional frame-
work, and that a statute will not be held void for 
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect 
may be given. 
In determining whether or not a statute or ordinance is vague, it 
must be sufficiently definite 
(1) lb inform persons of ordinary intelligence, who would be 
law abiding, what their conduct must be to conform to its requirements, 
(2) lb advise a defendant accused of violating it just what 
constitutes the offense with which he or she is charged, and 
(3) To be susceptible of uniform interpretation and appli-
cation by those charged with responsibility of apply and enforcing it. 
State v. Packard, supra, Greaves v. State, supra, State v. Owens, 638 
P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1981). 
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In fact, it is the established policy of the Utah Supreme Court to 
construe statutory provisions whenever possible in a way to avoid 
invalidating them on constitutional grounds. Greaves v. State, supra. 
For example, in State v. Laffertyf 749 P.2d 1239, 1260 (Utah 1988), 
the Utah Supreme Court imposed the requirement that juries be instructed 
to find that previous crimes of the defendant which have not resulted in 
convictions, introduced at a penalty phase, be proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. 
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah), cert, denied, 459 US 
988, 103 S. Ct 341, 74 L. Ed 2d 383 (1982), the Utah Supreire Court 
construed Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §76-3-207 to require 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty phase of a capital case 
that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circum-
stances, even though no specific burden of persuasion was provided in 
the statute. 
In Re Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No. Cs-1, 
754 P. 2d 633, 640-41 (Utah 1988) , the Utah Supreme Court went to great 
lengths to save the constitutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act by 
reading into it a host of new provisions which simply were next put in 
by the Legislature. 
The statutes herein, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-18 
through 77-7-21, state with sufficient clarity and conciseness: the 
right to issue citations on misdemeanors or infractions; the appearance 
required by citation; arrest for failure to appear; collection of bail 
amounts; disposition of fines and costs; service of the citation on 
defendant; filing in court; contents of citation; proceeding of the 
citation-foluntary forfeiture of bail; when an infomation is required 
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and so on. 
Ito use the logic set forth in Appellant's brief about the above 
statutes being vague because of difficulty in understanding the same as 
a violation of due process would invalidate argueably much of the 
Internal Revenue Code among others. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant's conviction of speeding should be affirmed. 
Appellant was properly issued a citation and signed his written premise 
to appeal rather than to be arrested and taken into custody by the 
arresting officer. In fact, a formal written information was filed by 
the prosecution and it was upon this information that Appellant was 
convicted. Furthermore, Logan City and/or State of Utah may establish a 
twenty mile per hour speed limit near a school when children are going 
to or leaving school during opening or closing hours. Finally, Utah 
Citation Enabling Act, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-7-18 
through 77-7-21, is constitutional. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30 day of August, 1989. 
Cheryl #. Russell 
Logan City Prosecutor 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
9-9'^ 
CITATION OR INFORMATION 
AND NOTICE TO APPEAR 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT. STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE 
IN THE MUNICIPAL DEPARTMENT OF LOGAN CITY. CACHE COUNTY UTAH 84321 
STATE Of UTAH ) No.C- 1 8 7 5 
S^SSSr t ** INFORMATION - AFFIDAVIT 
The undersigned being duly sworn upon his ooth deposes ond says f\^m 
/ £ „„..,, /Or* v&r «jf '2,fX** OP« S i 
' I o»i (Please j H i n t ) f u « f ^ Mtddl* v-s. 
Nome. 
Street J L 
A 9 « . z./ .Birth D o t e . 1 / < T 7 
^ 4 P 
Ofiv Lie N O 
Veh I K 
Moke. 
Sax ^ H W f i T e - ^ Q Female 
Q C h o u l ^ ^ 
T~a,fa/? - . i t y l e . 2. / - ^ 
Upon o public highway nomely ot (location). 
.Color 
? - ^ >51 Q*rj^ 
fl-K-U^. 
did unlowtully operate the obove daec/ibed vehicle in the city, county ond state a tore so id < 
then ond there commit the following offense 
5 r 
3 C 
o • 
2L± m p h in T& 
Impcafwr K f l T U * N a Not tgno l 
~/X*' </" £L 
wrong lone 
Imp/ope* RIGHT TURN Q No signal Q Into wrong Q From wrong 
Q Disobeyed TRAFFIC D Floshingrad 
CONTtOt SIGNAL 
Q Steady tmd 
D Improper backing 
D Too lost (or existing conditions 
Disobeyed STOP SIGN Q Wrong ploce Q W o l k speed O foster 
Improper PASSING Q At Intersection 
D A» ••* 
X walk 
8 Cut in Across 
phystcol bor 
O Wrong lone 
Q On right 
FAILURE TO YIELD Q Pad Q Veh FOt lOWING TOO CLOSE LY Q 
Other violations (describe) 
in violotion ol the (Stote Statute) (City Ordinonce) in such cose mode ond provided 
I o 
o ~ 
e o 
! i 
IS 
SLIPPERY 
PAVEMENT 
OTHER TRAFFIC 
PRESENT 
O Rom 
D Snow 
8 k . Night 
a fo£ 
a Snow 
D Cross 
nL^Ohcoming 
U Pede>Jr»an 
QU-»6me Oirect 
CAUSED PERSON 
TO DODGE 
Q Pedestrian 
8 Driver JUST MISSED 
ACCIDENT 
AREA D Business Q Industriol 
HIGHWAY TYPE D 2 lone Q 3 lone 
I PO Q PI D Fotol 
I Pod Q v e h 
Hit fined obiect 
I Right Angle 
Heod on 
Sideswipe 
Ron oil Rood 
Intersection 
end 
Residential 
O 4 lone divided 
I certify that a copy ot this Citation or Information was duty served upon the defendant 
according to law on the above date and I know or believe and so allege that the above named 
defendant did commit the offense herein set forth contrary to law I further certify that the 
court to which the defendant has been directed to appey is the proper court pursuant to 
SectJon77 7 21(SK 77 7 19) 
Sworn and subscribed to before me 
. day of . 198 
. Circuit Judge 
^^€^J^Ur^~C* 
Signature and identification of 
officer or other complainant) y 
? 7 da»of jZz£.i98_£T»t J^—JLwr-ET^ COURT APPEARANCE. 
ADORESS OF COURT & CLERK OFFICE. 140 NORTH 1ST WEST LOGAN, UTAH 
WITHOUT ADMITTING GUILT, I PROMISE TO APPEAR AS OIRECTEO HEREIN 
i 
oo 
- N I 
on 
d COURT COPY Signature ^Tfitt^faZr/z./, 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY, ) 
P l a i n t i f f I N F O R M A T I O N 
vs. ) 
THATCHER, Michael Stacey ^ p i f\l 7t <r Q CI 
1800 South 2800 West Q Q •? 0/ -' J 7 I 
Logan, Utah 
Defendant ) 
The undersigned, RICHARD HENDRICKS under oath, states on the 
information and belief that the above named Defendant committed the 
crime (s) of: 
SPEEDING (SCHOOL ZONE) (CLASS C MISDEMEANOR) 
at Logan, Utah on 12/16/88 in violation of the following sections of the 
Revised Ordinances of Logan City: 
42/7/1 
That, contrary to Logan City Ordinances, Defendant's acts 
constituting the offense were: 
That the Defendant did drive at a speed greater than was reasonable and 
prudent under the conditions and having regards to the actual and 
potential hazards then existing namely 33 mph in a 20 mph zone (SCHOOL 
ZONE), 
Class C Misdemeanor 
This information is based on evidence obtained fran the following 
witnesses: 
B. FILLMORE, LCPD 
Authorized for presentment & filing 
^ , Subscribed & svrornto before me 
Logan City Prosecutor/Attorney this -7 J^ ay of pj ^  19%^r, 
DAMAGES: YES " 
CIRCUIT cqmr JUDGE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Mar. 23, 1989 
REMITTITUR 
Dgan City, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
aren Thatcher, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Court of Appeals No. 880451-CA 
First Circuit Court 
Logan Dept. No. 825461 
Based upon the failure of respondent Logan City, a 
political subdivision of the State of Utah and the 
prosecutor herein, to appear at oral argument or to 
file a brief herein, the defendant's conviction is 
hereby reversed and the charge of driving on improper 
registration is dismissed. 
ssued: Feb. 17, 1989 
ecord: 1 VOL and 6 ENVS 
MOTOR VEHICLES 41-6-50 
•erators. Towing, impound, or storage fees are a 
»n on the vehicle. 
(8) The registered owner of the vehicle upon 
te payment of all fees and charges incurred in 
le seizure and impoundment of the owner's ve-
icle has a cause of action for all the fees and 
larges, together with damages, court costs, and 
itorney fees, against the operator of the vehicle 
hose actions caused the impoundment. 
(9) No liability may be imposed upon any 
eace officer, the state, or any of its political sub-
ivisions on account of the enforcement of this 
2Ction. 1987 
15. Reckless driving — Penalty. 
A person who operates any vehicle in willful or 
)n disregard for the safety of persons or property 
ilty of reckless driving. 
A person convicted of reckless driving is guilty 
lass B misdemeanor. Upon a first conviction, the 
ity is a minimum term of imprisonment of not 
• than five days, or a minimum fine of not less 
$25. On a second or subsequent conviction, the 
Ity is a minimum term of imprisonment of not 
* than ten days, or a minimum fine of not less 
$ 5 0 . 1987 
ARTICLE 6 
SPEED RESTRICTIONS 
46 . Speed regulations — Safe and appro-
priate s peeds at certain locations — 
Prima facie speed limits — Emergency 
power of the governor. 
I A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed 
ter than is reasonable and prudent under the 
itions and having regard to the actual and poten-
hazards then existing, including, but not limited 
'hen: 
(a) approaching and crossing an intersection 
or railroad grade crossing; 
(b) approaching and going around a curve; 
(c) approaching a hill crest; 
(d) traveling upon any narrow or winding 
roadway; and 
fe) special hazards exist with respect to pedes-
tr ians or other traffic or by reason of weather or 
highway conditions. 
!) Where no special hazard exists, and subject to 
section (3) and Sections 41-6-47 and 41-6-48, the 
)wing speeds are lawful. Any speed in excess of 
se limits is prima facie evidence that the speed is 
reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful: 
(a) twenty miles per hour when passing a 
school building or its grounds during school re-
cess or while children are going to or leaving 
school during opening or closing hours, except 
that local authorities may require a complete 
stop before passing a school building or grounds 
at any of these periods; 
(h) twenty-five miles per hour in any urban 
district; and 
(c) fifty-five miles per hour in other locations. 
3) The Governor by proclamation in time of war or 
ergency may change the speed limits on the high-
ys of the state. 1987 
•6-47. P r i m a facie speed limit. 
1) (a) When the Department of Transportation de-
termines upon the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that any prima facie speed 
under this article is not reasonable or safe under 
the existing conditions at any intersection or 
other place or on a state highway, the Depart-
ment of Transportation may determine a reason-
able and safe prima facie speed limit. 
(b) When changing a speed limit, the Depart-
ment of Transportation shall consult with local 
political units prior to erecting or changing any 
signs within local political boundaries. 
(2) The speed limit is effective when appropriate 
signs giving notice are erected at the intersection or 
other place or part of the highway. 1988 
41-6-48. Speed restrictions — Powers of local 
authorities — Posted speed. 
(1) When local authorities in their respective juris-
dictions determine on the basis of an engineering and 
traffic investigation that the prima facie speed per-
mitted under this article is not reasonable and safe 
under the conditions found to exist upon a highway or 
part of a highway, the local authority may determine 
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit which: 
(a) decreases the limit at intersections; 
(b) increases the limit within an urban dis-
trict; or 
(c) decreases the limit outside an urban dis-
trict, but not to less than 35 miles per hour. 
(2) Local authorities in their respective jurisdic-
tions shall determine by an engineering and traffic 
investigation the prima facie speed for all highways 
under their respective jurisdictions and shall declare 
a reasonable and safe prima facie limit, which may be 
different than the prima facie speed permitted under 
this chapter for an urban district. 
(3) Any limit altered under this section is effective 
when appropriate signs giving notice are erected 
upon the highway. 
(4) The Department of Transportation determines 
prima facie evidence of a lawful speed on state high-
ways whether the highways are within or without the 
corporate limits of any city. 1987 
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations. 
( 1 ) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a 
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal and 
reasonable movement of traffic except when: 
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe opera-
tion; 
(b) upon a grade; or 
(c) in compliance with official traffic control 
devices. 
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled ac-
cess highway at less than the lawful maximum speed 
side by side with and at the same speed as a vehicle 
operated in the adjacent right lane constitutes evi-
dence of impeding or blocking normal movement of 
traffic. 
(3) When the Department of Transportation or lo-
cal authorities within their respective jurisdictions 
determine on the basis of an engineering and traffic 
investigation that slow speeds on any part of a high-
way consistently impede the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic, the Department of Transporta-
tion or local authority may determine and shall post a 
minimum speed limit below which no person may op-
erate a vehicle except when necessary for safe opera-
tion. 1987 
41-6-50. Special speed limit on bridges — Prima 
facie evidence. 
(1) A person may not operate a vehicle over any 
bridge or other elevated structure which is a part of a 
highway at a speed which is greater than the maxi-
mum speed which may be maintained with safety on 
UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 77-7-21 
Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
ice officer, in lieu of taking a person into cus-
r any public official of any county or munici-
rharged with the enforcement of the law, may 
nd deliver a citation requiring any person sub-
arrest or prosecution on a misdemeanor or in-
n charge to appear at the court of the magis-
efore whom the person should be taken pursu-
law if the person had been arrested. 1980 
9. Appearance required by citation — Ar-
rest for failure to appear — Collection 
of bail amounts by Office of Recovery 
Services — Motor vehicle violations — 
Disposition of fines and costs. 
Persons receiving misdemeanor citations shall 
r before the magistrate designated in the cita-
n or before the time and date specified in the 
m. 
No citation shall require a person to appear 
r than five days or later than 14 days following 
3uance. 
Any person who receives a citation and who 
A3 appear on or before the time and date and at 
mrt specified shall be subject to arrest. The mag-
e may issue a warrant of arrest and may order 
)ffice of Recovery Services, within the Depart-
of Social Services, to enforce collection of any 
amounts ordered by the court. The Office of Re-
y Services may only permanently withhold its 
of collection from any bail amount collected 
h is subsequently forfeited. If the collected bail 
mt is forfeited, the appropriate percentage or 
mt of that forfeited bail shall be distributed to 
ippropnate governmental entity as provided by 
It is the intent of the Legislature that appropria-
; to the Department of Public Safety reflect a per-
age of the forfeited bail amounts collected by the 
:e of Recovery Services pursuant to this subsec-
and Section 62A-11-109, so that the costs of law 
rcement may be adequately recognized. 
) Except where otherwise provided by law, cita-
s or informations, issued for violations of Title 41, 
h Code Annotated 1953, shall state that the per-
receiving the citation or information shall appear 
re the magistrate nearest and most accessible to 
place of violation who has jurisdiction over the 
nse charged. If the citation or information is is-
i for a violation within the geographical bound-
's of any municipality or county precinct in which 
istice court exists and in which a justice of the 
ce is currently serving, such court shall be deemed 
nearest most accessible magistrate before whom 
h person shall appear; provided, however, that 
sistent with Section 78-4-5, informations or cita-
IS issued for driving under the influence of alcohol 
Irugs, driving with blood alcohol content of .10% or 
her, and reckless driving may be filed and tried in 
circuit court in the county where the offense oc-
Ted without regard to the location of the offense 
hin the county. 
5) Any justice of the peace may, upon his own mo-
n or upon the motion of either defense attorney or 
>secuting attorney, transfer cases to the nearest 
.tice of the peace court or the nearest circuit court 
thin said county, except those cases filed under mu-
:ipal ordinances. 
(6) It shall be the duty of clerks and other adminis-
itive personnel serving the circuit, juvenile, and 
stice courts to ensure that all citations for violation 
Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953, are filed prop-
erly in accordance with the foregoing subsection and 
to refuse to receive citations that should be filed in 
another court. Fines, fees, costs and forfeitures im-
posed or collected for violations of Title 41, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, which are not filed contrary to the 
foregoing subsections shall be paid over to the munic-
ipality or county entitled to the same by the state, 
county, or municipal treasurer who has received such 
fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the court which 
collected them. Such accounting and remitting of any 
sums due hereunder shall be accomplished at the 
close of the fiscal year of the municipality or county 
which has received fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures as 
a result of any improperly filed citations. 1988 
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant — Fil-
ing in court —- Contents of citations. 
(1) If a citation is issued pu r suan t to Section 
77-7-18, the peace officer or public official shall issue 
one copy to the person cited and shall within five days 
file a duplicate copy with the court specified in the 
citation. 
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under author i ty 
of th is chapter shall contain: 
(a) The name of the court before which the per-
son is to appear; 
(b) The name of the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charged; 
(d) The date , t ime and place a t which the of-
fense is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date on which the citation was issued; 
(f) The name of the peace officer or public offi-
cial who issued the citation, and the name of the 
a r res t ing person if an arres t was made by a pri-
vate par ty and the citation was issued in lieu of 
t ak ing the arrested person before a magis t ra te ; 
(g) The t ime and date on or before and after 
which the person is to appear; 
(h) The address of the court in which the per-
son is to appear; 
(i) A certification above the s ignature of the 
officer issuing the citation in substant ial ly the 
following language: "I certify t ha t a copy of this 
citation or information (Summons and Com-
plaint) was duly served upon the defendant ac~ 
cording to law on the above date and I know or 
believe and so allege tha t the above-named de-
fendant did commit the ofiense herein set forth 
contrary to law. I further certify tha t the court to 
which the defendant has been directed to appear 
is the proper court pursuan t to Section 77-7-21."; 
and 
(j) A notice containing substant ial ly the fol-
lowing language: 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not be 
used as an information without your consent If an 
information is filed you will be provided a copy by the 
court. You MUST appear in court on or before the 
t ime set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR 
AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND THE 
COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOUR AR-
REST. 1980 
77-7-21. Proceeding on citation — Voluntary 
forfeiture of bail — Information, when 
required. 
(1) Whenever a citation is issued pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 77-7-18, the copy of the citation 
filed with the magistrate may be u^ed in lieu of an 
information to which the person cited may plead 
77-7-22 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 174 
guilty or no contest and be sentenced or on which bail 
may be forfeited. With the magistrate 's approval a 
person may voluntarily forfeit bail without appear-
ance being required in any case of a class B misde-
meanor or less. Such voluntary forfeiture of bail shall 
be entered as a conviction and treated the same as if 
the accused pleaded guilty. 
(2) If the person cited willfully fails to appear be-
fore a magistrate pursuant to a citation issued under 
Section 77-7-18, or pleads not guilty to the offense 
charged, or does not deposit bail on or before the date 
set for his appearance, an information shall be filed 
and proceedings held in accordance with the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and all other applicable provi-
sions of this code, which information shall be deemed 
an original pleading; provided, however, tha t the per-
son cited may by written agreement waive the filing 
of the information and thereafter the prosecution 
may proceed on the citation notwithstanding any pro-
visions to the contrary. i»80 
77-7-22. Failure to appear as misdemeanor. 
Any person who willfully fails to appear before a 
court pursuant to a citation issued under the provi-
sions of Section 77-7-18 is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor, regardless of the disposition of the charge 
upon which he was originally cited. 1980 
77-7-23. Del ivery of prisoner arrested without 
warrant — Information — Violation as 
misdemeanor. 
When an arrest is made without a warrant by a 
peace officer or private person, the person arrested 
shall, without unnecessary delay, be taken to the 
magistrate in the precinct of the county or municipal-
ity in which the offense occurred, and in information, 
stat ing the charge against the person shall be made 
before such magistrate. In the event the magistrate of 
the precinct is not available, the arrested person shall 
be taken before the available magistrate nearest to 
the scene of the alleged offense. Any officer or person 
violating any of the provisions of this section shall be 
guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 1980 
C H A P T E R 8 
L I N E U P S 
Section 
77-8-1. Order of magistrate — Grounds — Ar-
rested suspect's appearance without or-
der. 
77-8-2. Suspect's right to have attorney present. 
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by suspect. 
77-8-1. O r d e r of m a g i s t r a t e — G r o u n d s — Ar-
res ted s u s p e c t s a p p e a r a n c e w i thou t 
o rde r . 
( D A magistrate may issue an order requiring a 
suspect to appear in a lineup when probable cause 
exists to believe a crime has been committed and 
there is reason to believe the suspect committed it. 
(2) A suspect who has been arrested, and is in cus-
tody, may be required by a peace officer to appear in a 
lineup without a court order. 
(3) Upon application of any suspect and a showing 
of good cause, a magistrate may order a lineup. 1980 
77-8-2. Suspec t ' s r igh t to h a v e a t t o r n e y p r e sen t . 
A suspect has the right to have his attorney present 
at any lineup. The magistrate or party in charge of 
the lineup shall notify the suspect of this right. Every 
suspect unable to employ counsel shall be entitled to 
representation by an attorney appointed by a magis-
trate for a lineup either before or after an arrest 
77-8-3. Conduct of peace officer. 
The peace officers conducting a lineup shall not at-
tempt to influence the identification of any particular 
suspect. im 
77-8-4. Record of proceedings — Access by sus-
p e c t 
The entire lineup procedure shall be recorded, in-
cluding all conversations between the witnesses and 
the conducting peace officers. The suspect shall have 
access to and may make copies of the record and anj 
photographs taken of him or any other persons in 
connection with the lineup. \m 
CHAPTER 9 
UNIFORM ACT ON FRESH PURSUIT 
Section 
77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another state. 
77-9-2. Procedure after arrest. 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state be-
yond normal jurisdiction. 
77-9-1. Authority of peace officer of another 
state. 
A peace officer of another state or the District of 
Columbia who enters this state in fresh pursuit and 
continues in fresh pursuit of a person in order to ar-
rest him on the ground that he is reasonably believed 
to have committed a felony in another state, has the 
same authority to arrest and hold a person in custody 
as a peace officer of this state. Fresh pursuit does not 
require instant action, but pursuit without unreason-
able delay. i$w> 
77-9-2. Procedure after arrest. 
An officer who has made an arrest pursuant to Sec-
tion 77-9-1 shall without unnecessary delay take the 
person arrested before a magistrate of the county in 
which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall con-
duct a hearing to determine the lawfulness of the 
arrest. If he finds the arrest was lawful, the magis-
trate may commit the person arrested for a reason-
able time or may admit the person to bail pending 
extradition proceedings. i«w? 
77-9-3. Authority of peace officer of this state 
beyond n o r m a l jur i sd ic t ion . 
(1) Any peace officer duly authorized by any gov-
ernmental entity of this state may exercise a peace 
officer's authority beyond the limits of such officer'* 
normal jurisdiction as follows: 
(a) When in frosh pursuit of an offender for the 
purpose of arresting and holding that person in 
custody or returning the suspect to the jurisdic-
tion where the offense was committed; 
(b) When a public offense is committed in such 
officer's presence; 
(c) When participating in an investigation of 
criminal activity which originated in such offi-
cer's normal jurisdiction in cooperation with the 
local authority; 
(d) When called to assist peace officers of an-
other jurisdiction. 
(2) Any peace officer, prior to taking such autho-
rized action, shall notify and receive approval of the 
local law enforcement authority, or if such prior con-
tact is not reasonably possible, notify the local law 
Chapter 7. 
SPEED REGULATIONS 
42-7-1. Speed Regulations—Maximum Speeds—School Buildings-
Intersections, Crossing, and Curves. 
(a) No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than 
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the 
actual and potential hazards then existing. In every event speed shall 
be so controlled as may be necessary to avoid col 1iding with any person, 
vehicle, or other conveyance on or entering the highway in compliance with 
legal requirements and the duty of all persons to use due care. 
(b) The following speeds shall be lawful unless otherwise posted. 
Speeds in excess of the following limits or in excess of the posted limits 
shall be prima facie evidence that the speeds are not reasonable and prudent 
and that they are unlawful: 
1. Twenty miles per hours when passing a school building or 
grounds thereof during school recess or while children 
are going to or leaving school during opening and 
closing hours. 
2. Twenty-five miles per hour in any business, residential 
or urban district inside the city limits of Logan City, 
unless otherwise posted. 
3. Speeds other than those listed in subparagraphs 1 and 
and 2 above may be allowed within the corporate limits 
of Logan City whenever it is determined upon the basis 
of an engineering and traffic investigation that the speed 
permitted by law is more or less than is necessary for the 
safe operation of the vehicles thereon. Any such change 
in speeds shall be posted by properly erected signs giving 
notice thereof. 
4. Speed limits on state highways within the city limits shall 
be as posted by the state. 
42-7-2. Driving Too Slow. No person shall drive a motor 
vehicle at such slow speed as to impede or block the normal and reasonable 
movement of traffic except when reduced speed is necessary for safe operation 
in compliance with law. 
42-7-3. Speed or Acceleration Contests. No person shall engage 
in any motor vehicle speed contest or in any motor vehicle acceleration 
contest on any street or alley, and no person shall aid or abet any such 
vehicle speed contest or acceleration contest on any street or alley. 
42-7-4. Obstruction for Exhibition Forbidden. No person shall 
for the purpose of facilitating, aiding or as an incident to any vehicle 
speed contest or vehicle acceleration contest in any manner obstruct or 
place any barricade or obstruction or assist or participate in placing any 
such barricade or obstruction upon any street or alley. 
(CHAPTER 7 AMENDED 9/23/82) 
"^Corrected 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the %D day of August, 1989, -f- nailed 
four (4) copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to David R. Daines, 
Attorney for Appellant, USU Box 1328, Logan, Utah 84322. 
Cheryl A/ Russell 
Logan City Prosecutor 
